1Local autonomy is a highly debated concept, whose definition is still controversial both from a legal and a political perspective (Panasyuk, 2018) [1]. Measuring its level is challenging as well. Nonetheless, given the empowerment of regional and local levels of government in recent decades (Sharpe, 1993; Keating, 1997; 1998; Kersting & Vetter, 2003), several studies have engaged in this effort and provided the first reliable large-scale comparative set of data, both cross-country and over time, on local autonomy at the regional (Hooghe et al., 2016) as well as municipal (Ladner et al., 2019) subnational level. Those indexes are usually provided at the country (national) level, and only irregularly at the subnational level. While undoubtedly valuable in terms of comparability and conciseness, they are nonetheless of limited use for in-depth and locally-based analyses.
2This article thus aims to provide a more differentiated evaluation of local autonomy by assessing the degree of municipal autonomy at the subnational level rather than aggregated at the national level. Previous research has only measured a differentiated degree of local (municipal) autonomy in cases of federal institutional arrangements (by evaluating municipal autonomy in the different constituent units of a federation), or of different competences given to clusters of municipalities of a particular size (e.g., by assessing big cities separately from other municipalities). Countries where municipalities belong to institutionally different subnational units—mainly those with special regions or territories, i.e. one or more areas, which enjoy (somewhat) different legal and institutional structures—remain unaddressed so far. This study aims to fill this gap. This article distinguishes the scores among institutionally different regions within a country, Italy, with an asymmetric institutional context but in which there has not yet been a differentiated assessment, leading to a gap in the literature. Further, choosing some regions [2] belonging to other (differently) asymmetric countries with comparable regional autonomy allows us to better illustrate the challenges of measuring local autonomy in differentiated sub-state contexts and the need to complement national scores with more specific regional ones. This differentiated assessment, both in Italy and in a comparative perspective, is detailed in two original datasets (Bolgherini et al., 2020a; 2020b; see also Appendix 2) released online, which provide new data and may enrich the debate on this topic.
3By stressing the salience of contexts when addressing the degree of local autonomy within a country, this article helps improve and refine not only its assessment, but also our understanding of local autonomy as a multi-dimensional concept, whose single aspects may vary sensibly across and within territories.
4To explore this issue in the cases selected, this article adopts a qualitative approach combined with the expert survey technique in which experts assign quantitative values and scores.
5The core finding of our analysis is that local autonomy depends remarkably on the territorial structure and features of a state and of its sub-state units: while higher regional autonomy is confirmed to play a role in local autonomy, we also found that, when a country is (constitutionally or politically) asymmetric, local autonomy may turn out to be different across its territory and may mirror de facto or context-driven contingencies rather than formally allocated competencies.
6The article is structured as follows: after introducing the strand of literature this article builds upon, the specific asymmetry of the Italian case and relevant expectations are presented, the methodological aspects addressed, and the findings revealed. The last section discusses these findings, puts forward new avenues of research, and concludes this contribution.
Local Autonomy, Asymmetry, and Differentiated Measurements
7Political-administrative decentralization and the strengthening of peripheral governments have been among the most relevant phenomena in Western democracies since the 1970s (Batley & Stoker, 1991). In the four decades from the 1970s to the 2000s, the trend has been to favor the local—through the conferment of powers and functions, the strengthening of its legitimacy and organs—in center/periphery relations. Since the 1980s in particular, the idea of bringing decision-making closer to the people on the grounds of efficiency, accountability, and autonomy has gained momentum, along with the role of sub-state (both regional and local) authorities (Sharpe, 1979; 1993; Keating, 1998) and the establishment of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in 1985.
8The concepts of decentralization and local autonomy are multi-faceted, still highly-debated (Page 1984; Keuffer, 2016; 2021), and often treated as being very close, with the former traditionally considered to favor the later (Page, 1982; King & Stoker, 1996). They overlap with each other to some extent as well as with local democracy (Pratchett, 2004; Franzke & Schaap, 2021). Indeed, local autonomy is considered, in general, to nurture proximity and local democracy (Oates, 1972; Dahl & Tufte, 1973).
9However, as Pratchett (2004, p. 359) argues, “a conceptual separation of local autonomy from local democracy allows for the existence of locally determined differences within nation states”.
10This brings the concept of asymmetry to the forefront. Asymmetry may have both legal and political aspects. In federal studies, symmetry refers to the federal units that, in principle, all have the same constitutional competencies and powers, whereas asymmetry is used where the federal units are treated differently, especially regarding their autonomy. However, de facto asymmetries also occur in symmetrical institutional contexts (Ladner & Mathys, 2018; Requejo & Nagel, 2011). Therefore, if also accounting for structural—e.g., socio-economic, geographical, demographic, political—characteristics, it is more appropriate to consider as asymmetric countries both those with constitutionally differentiated subnational units/regions (formally un-equally endowed with powers and prerogatives) and those with de facto asymmetries (i.e., subnational units/regions formally equally endowed, but implementing their prerogatives differently, or presenting structural features that de facto differentiate them). In other words, both constitutionally and politically asymmetric countries (Requejo 2011, p. 5). This distinction may apply to both federal and non-federal countries.
11In the past decades, many attempts have been made to provide international indicators or indexes to measure decentralization and sub-state autonomy.
12As Harguindéguy et al. (2021) accurately reviewed, most of these attempts use a quantitative approach and a series of standard indicators (such as expenditures and revenues) covering fiscal, administrative, and political aspects. Some of these measurements aim at large-scale comparisons (IMF, 2018; OECD, 2015), some may aim at framing local autonomy within a particular perspective—for instance, Ivanyna and Shah (2014) used these standard indicators to measure how close the government was to the people. Other studies focused instead on qualitative aspects such as the role of party systems or the degree of formalization of intergovernmental relations, claiming that these helps reveal the dynamics of local governments (do Vale, 2015) that large datasets may fail to explain. Alternatively, they explored the decision-making aspects of local decisions and local administrative practices to more accurately assess local autonomy (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006).
13There have been fewer attempts to measure autonomy across heterogeneous, asymmetric units of analysis. Sub-state units (municipalities, provinces, regions) are fairly often aggregated to assess the autonomy of the overall subordinate level: this is the case in many of the older contributions, starting with the classical models by Lijphart (1999), but also in recent indexes (OECD, 2015). Partial exceptions are the Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) and the Local Autonomy Index (LAI).
14The RAI—elaborated by Liesbet Hooghe and colleagues (Marks, Hooghe & Schakel, 2008a; 2008b; Hooghe et al., 2010; Hooghe et al., 2016)—is the first systematic attempt to measure, code, and then analyze regional autonomy around the world, covering 81 countries over a time span of approximately six decades. The RAI considers the two macro-dimensions of Self-Rule and Shared-Rule—the degree of self-government of a subnational government within its own territory and the decision-making power a subnational government shares in the country as a whole—and disentangles them into ten variables (from institutional depth to fiscal autonomy, from various types of control to constitutional reform).
15Some years later, the same approach was used to measure the level of local autonomy, namely the municipal level, with the introduction of the LAI by Andreas Ladner and colleagues (Ladner et al., 2015; Keuffer, 2016; Ladner et al., 2019). The LAI mirrored, with some appropriate modifications—mainly the replacement of Shared-rule with an Interactive-rule to better account for the multilevel aspect of local realities, and the subdivision into a total of 11 variables —, the RAI concept and the use of different dimensions to cover all relevant aspects of local autonomy in different countries. This last index aims to assess the extent of decentralization in the countries of the European Union. The original research considered 39 countries, covering all (at that time) 28 European Union Member States and 11 other neighboring countries [3] over about 25 years.
16An undoubted value of these two contributions is that they provide an aggregated index that is usable for comparative research and quantitative analyses. Cross-country and diachronic analyses fruitfully benefit from the availability of such indexes. These two indexes, in particular, among the many which, in the past decades, have addressed the issue of measuring decentralization, are considered to be the ones that best comply with international quality standards as well as being “one of the most up-to-date and complete studies of European local governments” (Harguindéguy et al., 2021).
17Nevertheless, the issue of asymmetries is only partially addressed and fixed. While the RAI focuses on the regional level and differentiated regions are accounted for, differentiation for the municipal level is more challenging. The LAI (Ladner et al., 2019, p. 38-41)—which our analysis draws upon—provides an overall country score, and two differentiations only differentiations are presented (Ladner et al., 2019, pp. 38-41). The first regards federal states where, since municipalities are often steered by the relevant constituent units they belong to, this institutional asset can lead to different degrees of local autonomy in the various federal subunits. The second is the case of non-federal countries, where some local authorities are explicitly and formally endowed with different powers and prerogatives compared to others in the country, i.e., large cities in France (Paris, Lyon, Marseille), or the distinction between smaller municipalities and larger cities in several Eastern European countries. In both cases, those differentiated assessments are ultimately weighted by population to compute the final score. In federal countries, municipal autonomy is assessed within each region, with all municipalities within a same region receiving the same score. In contrast, in non-federal countries, it is assessed at the municipal level in the different groups with the same prerogatives (e.g., municipalities above a certain population size), every municipality within these groups having the same score.
18Nonetheless, another asymmetry at the municipal level remains largely unaddressed by the LAI measurements and needs to be included in order to avoid possible biases and provide more accurate assessments. It is the instance of non-federal countries where municipalities are embedded in a significantly different (provincial or regional) institutional context—e.g., regions empowered with asymmetric constitutional prerogatives—that renders a non-differentiated assessment too biased or imprecise. This, despite municipal autonomy being formally the same (since municipalities hold the same powers all over the country). These cases may include countries like Italy, Spain, some Eastern European countries, but also France (e.g., Corsica, Britany, Overseas territories), etc. The LAI authors acknowledge that “quite often there are in fact several levels/organizations of local government, there is a very strong intermediate tier” (Ladner et al., 2019, p. 41). In those cases, the provincial/county/district/regional tier is entitled to manage the respective local level, and this is done in a quite asymmetrical institutional context. The consequence is a de facto difference in local autonomy, which remains overlooked if not properly addressed, or inaccurately included in one of the two alternatives that the LAI currently provides [4]. Our analysis tries to fill this gap by accounting for this additional, albeit neglected, case of asymmetry in the emblematic example of Italy. This could help shed light on other context-driven different local autonomies and thus enrich the debate and empirical data on this topic.
Italian asymmetric institutional setting and relevant expectations
19Italy has an asymmetric regionalized system that has also been labeled a “federal country without federalism” (Palermo, 2012) or quasi-federalism (Lippi, 2011). The Italian local government landscape has municipalities (Comuni), provinces (Province), metropolitan cities (Città metropolitane), and regions (Regioni). Since the 1948 Constitution, there are 20 regions in Italy vested with legislative and administrative competences. Five of these (the three northern territories Trentino-South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Aosta Valley and the two islands Sardinia and Sicily), were granted special status due to linguistic minorities, international obligations, autonomous or independent political movements and/or their geographical peripheral position. These Regioni a statuto speciale—SSRs—created by the Constitution enjoy special forms and conditions of autonomy (Art. 116 Const.). Four regions were granted special autonomy as early as 1948, Friuli-Venezia Giulia followed in 1963. In addition, the region of Trentino-South Tyrol, bordering Austria, is made up since 1972 of two autonomous provinces (Trento and Bolzano/Bozen), which are endowed in turn with legislative powers, leaving the region with only a minor role (Zwilling & Klotz, 2020). The remaining 15 ordinary regions (Regioni a statuto ordinario – OSRs) were (homogeneously) given fewer powers than the SSRs, and the legislation implementing their effective functioning only dates back to 1970. Besides this institutionalized and constitutional asymmetry between the two clusters of regions—in terms of legislative competences, financial systems, the legal foundations of their self-government, and intergovernmental relations with the state—Italy also has a high level of de-facto asymmetry. Italian territories are very diverse in their economic performance (North vs South) and their socio-political culture. Additionally, the five SSRs are very heterogenous and use their autonomy differently (Palermo & Valdesalici, 2019).
20Since the 1990s, a series of reforms aimed at federalizing the country (Brunazzo, 2010) have been implemented. However, they turned out to be a “failed federalization” (Baldi & Baldini, 2014), mainly due to these ‘federal’ reforms being imposed from above (Baldi & Tronconi, 2011). This means, on the one hand, that Italy only slowly and partially abandoned its original centralized Napoleonic structure; and, on the other hand, that the strong institutional asymmetry between the SSRs and the OSRs, in place since the 1948 Constitution, remained substantially unaltered over time. The 2001 constitutional reform, which enshrined the principle of subsidiarity, reduced and aligned the differences between OSRs and SSRs in terms of legislative powers but the core institutional asymmetry between the two clusters remained. The planned constitutional reform in 2016 (rejected by a popular referendum) had intended a process of centralization in favor of the state. In contrast, some OSRs demanded more autonomy. This possibility was introduced in the Italian Constitution (art. 116.3) in 2001 and used for the first time in 2017 by Veneto, Lombardy, and Emilia-Romagna. However, it is currently stuck.
21Against this background, we are able to formulate some expectations related to local autonomy in Italy, both in the OSRs and the SSRs. First of all, we can expect that:
- E1) SSRs score differently (namely higher) on local autonomy than OSRs.
22Along with different legislative and administrative powers, other institutional aspects distinguish OSRs from SSRs (Palermo & Valdesalici, 2019). First, article 123 of the Constitution provides that each Italian region has a statute that establishes its form of government (following the Constitution) and the principles of its structure: only the statutes of the five SSRs have the rank of constitutional law, while those of the OSRs have that of state law. Secondly, their financial resources are different: the financial autonomy of each SSR is laid down, like its legislative powers, in the relevant statute, while OSRs are regulated in this respect by the Constitution or by ordinary legislation. The SSRs’ financial resources are also negotiated bilaterally with the state, which is not the case for OSRs. A third difference is the vertical cooperation mechanism with the central government: there is an ad-hoc bilateral body in all SSRs but not in the OSRs. This bilateral body is a joint commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the state and of each SSR. A further issue, to which little attention has been paid thus far, but which we believe to be a central feature that sets SSRs apart from OSRs, is the regulation of local authorities. Whereas the regulation of the local entities lies generally at the national level, the special regions have the legislative competence to regulate them directly, within the constitutional, international, and European framework (D’Orlando & Grisostolo, 2018; Woelk, 2014). Since Constitutional Law No.2/1993 (Sicily since 1946), all SSRs enjoy exclusive legislative competence regarding their local authorities (D’Orlando & Grisostolo, 2018) [5]. In fact, the five SSRs, unlike the 15 OSRs, regulate their local authorities, including their functions, and supervise their political organs through a separate regional law. This also holds true for the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen, whose exclusive competence over local authorities pertains to the SSR Trentino-South Tyrol [6], but whose local autonomy should be however considered separately. First, because many legislative and administrative competences that directly or indirectly influence municipalities are found at the level of the autonomous provinces and not at the regional level, e.g., urban planning or public buildings. Secondly, some aspects concerning local autonomy, such as local finances, local taxes, administrative supervision or intergovernmental relations, are fully or partly regulated by provincial laws.
23In sum, many aspects covered by the LAI indicators, from the financial to the organizational and to policy issues, differ significantly between SSRs and ORSs. These include all financial dimensions (regulated by the special statutes and bilaterally negotiated with the state), organizational autonomy on Self-Rule (due to the exclusive legislative competence in the organization of local authorities), legal protection (due to SSRs statutes having the rank of constitutional law), and regional access (due to the vertical cooperation mechanism) on Interactive-Rule.
24This leads us to expand our first expectation, namely that:
- E1a) SSRs are expected to score differently than OSRs, especially on those dimensions where their specificity may matter more.
25Moreover, in recent years, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, several reforms have involved Italian local authorities and their relative power allocation, in particular metropolitan cities replacing some provinces, and the transfer of governance and steering powers in the hands of the regions (Schakel et al., 2018; Bolgherini et al., 2016; Bolgherini et al., 2018c). Municipalities were involved in (top-down-encouraged) merging processes [7] and/or in increased intermunicipal cooperation (Bolgherini et al., 2018a; 2018b)—although without changing their competences and powers so that Italian municipalities still struggle between the uniformity and differentiation principles [8]. Moreover, the austerity measures introduced all over Europe in the wake of the financial crisis (Randma-Liiv & Kickert, 2017; Lippi & Tsekos 2019) also impacted local governments, although indirectly so, usually by shrinking their autonomy (Bolgherini, 2016).
26The 2014 LAI measurements and relevant country reports do not account for all these changes (Ladner et al. 2015c). This founds our second expectation, namely that:
- E2) the overall 2020 country scores per dimensions should be different from those in 2014.
27Moving to a comparative perspective, studies have shown that federal countries usually display higher degrees of autonomy at the sub-state level than centralized countries: their regional subnational/sub-state entities are therefore more powerful and enjoy broader competences and leeway (Hooghe et al., 2010), especially if they hold law-making powers (Moore, 2008). At the same time, strong regions do not necessarily mean weak local governments, as in a zero-sum game (Ladner et al., 2019). Indeed, regional autonomy and local autonomy appear to be highly positively correlated (Callanan & Tatham 2014), and so are their relevant indexes, LAI and RAI (Ladner et al., 2019, pp. 310-311). Against this background, we could expect that, in general, federal/regionalized countries score higher on local autonomy than centralized or less regionalized ones.
28Austria and Switzerland—taken here to broaden our study, as explained later—are both federal systems and have, among the European states, a high level of regional autonomy: in the last available Regional Autonomy Index, in 2016, Austria scored 23.0 and Switzerland 26.5. In comparison, Italy had a RAI of 23.9 (Hooghe et al., 2016).
29Therefore, a third expectation can be laid down as follows:
- E3) Italian regions are expected to show lower (or at least equal) LAI scores than the Austrian and Swiss regions.
Case selection, Method and Data
Case selection
30This article focuses on the Italian case as a paradigmatic example of asymmetry within national borders, and thus of the need for a contextually-differentiated assessment of local autonomy. For this purpose, the two types of Italian regions (the Ordinary Status Regions-OSRs, and the Special Status Regions-SSRs) have not only been examined separately, but the SSRs group has been split and each special region assessed on its own. Moreover, the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen forming the Trentino-South Tyrol are treated as two separate units on equal footing with the other SSRs.
31To further support our argument, additional evidence was gathered in two neighboring countries (Switzerland and Austria) [9]. Contrarily to Italy, these countries have a federal arrangement and have been assessed in the LAI (Ladner et al., 2015a) both by country and by their subnational units (Cantons and Länder, respectively). They represent an institutional setting of so-called symmetric federalism, where all subnational units enjoy the same degree of self-government, but with politically highly asymmetric contexts, where each subnational unit displays different features (Requejo, 2011, p. 5) and different influences on policy-making (Ladner & Mathys, 2018, p. 19) and thus, expectedly, a different level of local autonomy. 2020 data were retrieved for two Swiss Cantons (Valais, Grisons) and three Austrian Länder (Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Styria). Those regions were chosen as mere examples providing additional information to better study the core Italian case and better illustrate the challenge of measuring local autonomy in areas with differentiated sub-state contexts.
Method
32Consistently with the original LAI assessment, our analysis is based on an expert survey and scores given by a panel of experts. The unit of analysis is the municipal level. Experts were asked to assess the autonomy of the municipal level as a whole in their respective country and/or region (province for the Italian autonomous provinces). The survey was structured in two sections, namely A) Country Assessment and B) Region Assessment. Both assessments rely on the well-known dimensions and relevant indicators of Self-Rule and Interactive-Rule, employed for the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) by Ladner et al. (2019), and previously introduced by Hooghe et al. (2016) for the Regional Autonomy Index (RAI). Self-Rule has eight dimensions covering the formal authority of the subnational level over its territory, while the three dimensions of Interactive-Rule represent the influence of the subnational level in shaping central policy-making, stressing the central-local relations as mutual and intertwined [10]. To ensure as much replication as possible and maintain comparability with the original dataset we used the questions and the coding instructions (Ladner et al., 2015b) of the original research by Ladner et al. (2019). The scores on the different dimensions of local autonomy were collected through an online questionnaire, submitted between May and August 2020 (Bolgherini et al., 2020a, 2020b), in which experts provided their evaluations and optional written assessments for each indicator. Moreover, when needed, additional interviews by phone/skype or email with the same panel of experts were conducted to clarify certain points or explain and consolidate their assessments. Also for comparability reasons, the reported scores refer to the mean values by country and by region, consistently with the previous LAI assessment (Ladner et al., 2015; 2019). Analogously, the construction of the panel of experts relied as extensively as possible on the LAI research (Ladner et al., 2019) and tried to involve the same scholars and provide a reliable update of the previous results. At the same time, new experts were asked to participate to enlarge the pool, as well as the competencies and research disciplines, with an attempt to include regional experts to help capture regional peculiarities. As expert surveys usually require the number of experts to be limited (around six for each observation) (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007; Marks et al., 2007), a total of 30 experts were involved (18 for Italy, seven for Austria, and five for Switzerland).
33This technique was used because we believe that replicating the data is important and that the advantages of this method perfectly fit our goals. Nonetheless, we are aware of the limitations of this technique (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007; Marks et al., 2007), the first of which being that it is inherently subjective. Other similar studies have preferred other methods, like a dialogue among coders (Hooghe et al., 2016, pp. 30-33) to avoid common errors like the inconsistency of repeated measurements, inter-coding reliability, personal bias, the different-response-to-the-same-question problem, and so on. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, the fact that expert surveys are a practical, inexpensive, and flexible research tool “to derive systematic estimates of otherwise unobservable political characteristics” (Benoit & Wiesehomeier, 2009, p. 511) and that this technique eliminates “the need to have specific sources of information (e.g., laws, government documents) available for all cases” (Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 48), were major advantages and convinced us to proceed in this way.
Data
34This article refers to the Local Autonomy Index in its not-weighted version—sometimes referred to simply as LA (Local Autonomy, see Ladner et al., 2015b)—i.e., with scores ranging between 0 and 37. Self- and Interactive-Rule score points were simply summed up without further transformation into the final 0-100 range (Ladner et al., 2019, p. 213 ss.) [11]. This rawer score was preferred to the weighted version because the comparison scope of our analysis is much more restricted than the original dataset, as well as for the sake of straight comparability since the regionally-differentiated scores (when assessed) are only available in this simpler form, without the weighting of the different components.
35The degree of autonomy for municipalities at each territorial level (region- and country-level) was assessed separately (parts B and A, respectively). Country-level data refer to scores ascribed by the experts considering the municipal level as a whole (and thus without any kind of regional-context specifications). Regional-level data have been attributed instead by referring to municipalities in the specific region under consideration. The 2020 data were compared to the last available ones, namely those from 2014 (Ladner et al., 2019).
Findings and Discussion: Comparing Differentiated Contexts
36The 2014 LA values for Italy scored 25.50 (Ladner et al., 2015a; 2019) and referred to all 20 regions together (both OSRs and SSRs), without any differentiation between them.
37Following the methodology exposed in the previous section, 2020 scores were assigned separately for OSRs and for each SSR and autonomous province and then compared with the overall 2014 score. Results are shown in table 1.
LAI scores for Italy per dimension and type. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
LAI scores for Italy per dimension and type. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
Note: 2014 scores were retrieved by Ladner et al. (2015b); 2020 scores were assigned to the 15 OSRs and to each SSR (here reported their average); for the sake of direct comparability with 2014, column 2 shows the average scores of both SSRs and OSRs.38Scores in 2020 (columns 2 to 5)—no matter the type considered—are overall lower than in 2014 on both Self- (SR) and Interactive-Rule (IR), and on almost all dimensions. Except for effective political discretion (that is how much municipalities can truly decide on their functions) and borrowing autonomy (the extent to which municipalities can borrow to finance their investments) on Self-Rule, all other scores are regularly lower. The groups of OSRs and SSRs will be analyzed separately to try and provide evidence for our expectations which we will discuss in the next section.
Local autonomy in ordinary status regions
39The lower scores on six out of eight dimensions of Self-Rule (SR) and on all three dimensions of Interactive-Rule (IR) compared to 2014 result in a significantly lower overall LAI score (18.78, column 3 vs. 25.50, column 1).
40However, beyond the scores, our aim here is essentially to explore the possible reasons for these discrepancies, and identify whether they can be explained by the different contexts in which the municipalities are embedded. The single dimensions (reported in italics and numbered) are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs, with the help of the experts’ comments.
41Scores are lower on Institutional Depth (1). Local authorities in OSRs can choose from a very narrow, predefined set of activities within a quite strict (national and regional) legislative framework and significant budget restrictions. Within this predefined set, municipalities can choose to pursue one task or another, depending on the political climate and the current institutional framework. Moreover, their basic missions can—with some restrictions—be fulfilled through inter-municipal cooperation, thus broadening, especially in smaller-sized units, the range of tasks possible. In most policy areas, municipalities share responsibility with other government levels, be it the state or, to a greater extent, the region. Therefore, local government is only partly involved in service delivery and in the management of public policies (2. Policy scope). For example, the construction and/or maintenance of school buildings is a competence that municipalities share with the provincial level; while social security is shared with the regional level; police is a state competence, but the municipal police is managed at the municipal level. Despite a certain allocation of duties and functions, municipalities often suffer from a lack of resources to manage these same tasks. Dependence on state transfers remains high in OSRs; thus, Fiscal autonomy (4) is conversely quite low and their non-negligible autonomy in taxing their citizens turns out to be less incisive than expected (and foreseen). Local taxes mainly come from real estate. Overall, regions are responsible for local finance agreements, and their municipalities decide how local taxes are distributed. State transfers flow into the regions’ budgets: most of these transfers are unconditional, while a small number are tied to specific tasks and functions. The crucial point is that the State Financial transfer system (5) has much more to do with the regions than with the municipalities, whose transfers come mainly from the relevant region and are mostly conditional—thus often leaving municipalities short on resources. Given the pitfall of the financial transfer system, municipalities in OSRs rely considerably on their own revenues (6. Financial self-reliance) rather than on transfers from above. The proportion of such revenues relative to the overall municipal revenues may nonetheless vary to a great extent. The degree of municipal capacity to shape some aspects of its organization freely (8. Organizational autonomy) has remained the same on paper. The state laws that set out all aspects of the electoral rules and the norms for hiring, fixing salaries or establishing legal entities have not changed. The lower score may be caused by the experts’ perception that there are more limitations since the years of austerity, regarding, for example, hiring capacity and other daily organizational activities, which are unaltered in the task at hand but limited in scope due to financial constraints. Municipalities in ORSs cannot directly access the Constitutional Court, but the Legal protection (9) of their autonomy is guaranteed, beyond the Constitution, by administrative courts and tribunals. Legal controls over local government were abolished in 2001, but central Administrative supervision (10) on performance assessment of local expenditures (through the Court of Auditors) has increased—and even become exacerbated—since the 2010s and the global financial crisis. The lower score compared to the 2014 assessment probably stems from the effects of this tighter and more obtrusive central supervision—visible mostly in the second half of the 2010s. The main channels for municipalities to access higher-level governments’ policy-making (11. Central/regional Access) are the Permanent Council of Local authorities at the subnational, and the Local authorities-Regions-State conferences at the national level. These bodies have a merely consultative, although compulsory, function. Experts emphasize that municipal representation is ensured more through informal channels than through institutional bodies.
42As stated previously, only two dimensions scored higher. The Borrowing autonomy (7) of the OSRs’ municipalities is higher than previously scored, despite the limitations imposed by the expenditure caps introduced during austerity (mostly since 2010), and by the conditional use (investments) of such borrowing, as well as by the controls from central and/or higher-level governments. Finally, municipalities in OSRs decide on service aspects in the functions they are responsible for (3. Effective political discretion) and score higher than in 2014 despite the financial constraints, which often limit this discretion and lead to several competencies being managed without resources.
Local autonomy in special status regions
43The same overall (lower than 2014) results hold true for the Special Status Regions (SSRs) in 2020, although with more mixed evidence. Table 2 shows the single-region scores and their variation with respect to 2014.
44As shown in Table 2, four dimensions on Self-Rule (Institutional depth, Fiscal autonomy, Financial self-reliance, and Organizational autonomy) and two on Interactive-Rule (Administrative supervision and Central/regional access) score primarily lower, while the usual two on SR (Effective political discretion and Borrowing autonomy) score (mostly) higher. More mixed evidence was found in Policy scope and Financial transfer system on SR and in Legal protection on IR.
LAI scores for each Italian Special Status Regions (SSRs) and Autonomous Provinces per dimension. 2014, 2020, and variation (+/-)
LAI scores for each Italian Special Status Regions (SSRs) and Autonomous Provinces per dimension. 2014, 2020, and variation (+/-)
45These results are briefly sketched out below to try to explain the reasons behind the different scores, relying again on the experts’ comments.
46For Institutional depth (1), municipalities in five out of six SSRs are assigned a lower score compared to 2014. The reasons for that are the non-negligible influence of regional legislation and regional administrative acts on the local level, which may diminish local autonomy in choosing their activities. There is interesting evidence that in some territories (notably in the autonomous provinces) the way institutional depth—i.e., the extent to which municipalities are autonomous and can choose their activities—is understood also depends on how much autonomy the territory seems to want. Indeed, the same extent of autonomy may in fact be assessed as narrow if the territory aspires to broader autonomy, and as adequate if not. As for municipal fiscality, SSRs’ municipalities show more limited regulation of the local taxation of their population than attributed overall (4. Fiscal autonomy). It is mainly related to property, estate, and commercial activities, while other services and taxes (like trash collection) are regulated by the state or the region—and municipalities can eventually regulate rates and tax-bases. Also, municipalities in all six SSRs score lower on Financial self-reliance (6), showing a de facto dependence on regional (or provincial) funding and its (mostly conditional) transfers. Also, the criteria of distribution of this regional budget constrains municipalities (some more than others). All special regions also score lower on Organizational autonomy (8), i.e., their ability to decide their own organizational matters. Electoral rules are the most striking example of this: they are decided by regional laws in SSRs. On the contrary, other rules (e.g., those concerning legal entities and businesses) are possible only in some regions (e.g., Friuli Venezia-Giulia). The organization of the local administration (e.g., human resources) is also decided by the special region itself, although these rules are often similar to those imposed by the state on the OSRs, thus possibly accounting for the low scores on this dimension. Turning to IR, despite there being no longer any legal control by the higher-ranked political authorities since the early 2000s, municipalities in almost all SSRs suffer from stronger Administrative supervision (10) introduced during the austerity years of the global crisis. Internal controls and Court of Auditors’ checks on, among others, the regularity and amounts of expenditures and budgets, have in fact increased for all local authorities. The low scores of Central/regional access (11)’s very much depend on how the role of the various consultative bodies of local authorities (both at the regional/provincial—e.g., the Councils of Local Authorities—and at the national level) is rated or perceived. One of the formal channels is the permanent conferences at the state level, but municipalities pursue more informal channels, both at the national and regional levels, mostly through the National Association of Municipalities (ANCI) and its regional branches. In SSRs the weak and consultative conference system is barely accepted, and a more incisive role would be expected.
47Interestingly, there is mixed evidence in Policy scope (2). According to the experts, this is due to the different mix of areas of competences between regions and local authorities and to the different quotas of state/region/municipality legislation and responsibility. The effective involvement of municipalities in service delivery highly depends on this balance. Also, for the Financial transfer system (5), municipalities in three special regions out of six show lower scores than those previously attributed. Interestingly, this is because of the role played by the regional/provincial conditional transfers. State transfers are mostly unconditional while the regional ones are, more often than not, conditional and thus more constraining. Finally, scores on Legal protection (9) are mixed but mostly stable. Despite some scores being different, all experts stress how legal protection only involves administrative courts (or other judicial tools) since local authorities have no direct access to the Constitutional Court.
48Only two dimensions had scores that were higher in 2020 than in 2014. Municipalities in most SSR regions do show higher scores in Effective political discretion (3), that is the real influence local government has over its functions and its delivery of services. If it is true that higher-ranked authorities may establish some minimum level of performance, it is also true that municipalities can have a say on the way services are implemented and be responsible for how they are provided. This degree varies remarkably across different policy areas. Also, municipalities in all six SSRs show higher Borrowing autonomy (7) than previously, despite some non-negligible limits being set—mostly in the austerity years—to limit public indebtment.
Measuring local autonomy when autonomy is high: evidence from Austria and Switzerland
49Observing federal systems allows for further insights when exploring local autonomy in asymmetric contexts. Local autonomy at the subnational level in Switzerland and Austria was already measured in the LAI 2014 assessment (Ladner et al., 2015a). Austria has nine Länder and Switzerland 26 Cantons, but their federal systems differ. The first is often classified as a unitary federal state (Pernthaler, 2000) given the strong position of the national level within its multilevel system. The Austrian Federal Constitution dedicates an entire section to the “self-administration” of local authorities (art. 115-120), recognized as administrative districts and as territorial authorities with the right to self-government. They are described as the “third tier” of Austrian federalism (Eberhard, 2013). Local authorities mostly depend on the Federal Constitution, which regulates in detail the functions and organization of municipalities (Öhlinger, 1997; Gamper, 2006). On the contrary, Switzerland can be cited as “one of the most federal states” (Mueller & Vatter, 2016) with a high degree of self-government of subnational units. In the Swiss Federal Constitution, local authorities are mentioned only marginally, although the reference to the principle of subsidiarity underscores their autonomy (Biaggini, 2017). The highly decentralized Swiss institutional arrangement means that local autonomy depends on cantonal legislation and subnational constitutions which deal almost exclusively with municipalities and grant them broad freedom of action (Fiechter, 2010; Mueller, 2011).
50The empirical evidence gathered in 2020 for Austria shows several (albeit slight) differences compared to 2014, on the Institutional depth, Policy scope, Fiscal autonomy, and Central/regional access dimensions (Table A1, Appendix 2). The 2020 scores also differ from 2014 across the three sampled regions (Styria, Vorarlberg, Tyrol). Perhaps not by chance, the dimensions that vary most are those where different institutional or context-driven conditions may matter more, but also where those competences do not depend exclusively on the subnational level but are also regulated or co-regulated by the state. One example is Policy scope—which evaluates to what extent local authorities are responsible for a specific mission, such as employing teachers or town development. Despite the fact that some of the duties of Austrian municipalities are directly mentioned in the Federal Constitution (e.g. social assistance), this dimension is intertwined with the decision powers of other levels of government, making it extremely complex to disentangle (Gamper, 2012). A number of experts also stressed how some of these missions (e.g., traffic police and public order police) are not always univocally interpreted in Austrian law: it may thus happen that municipalities are fully responsible for administrating a matter despite legislation referring to the federal or the Land level as the legally competent authority. Also, Fiscal autonomy scores show discrepancies across Länder even if their scope of action is theoretically (equally) low: Austrian local authorities can set only minor fees, while most are established by federal law (Gamper, 2008). However, since municipalities do receive important tax revenues—e.g., through a property tax (Grundsteuer) and the municipal tax (Kommunalsteuer)—this could explain these different scores. Further dimensions on which differences among the Austrian Länder were already remarkable in 2014 (Ladner et al., 2015c) and remained so in 2020 are Financial self-reliance and, especially, Organizational autonomy, confirming that Austrian subnational units legislate autonomously on the reorganisation of local territory, local elections, local authorities, direct democracy, and subnational intergovernmental relations (Gamper, 2012). Moreover, differentiated scores are found on the Central/regional access dimension showing a difference in the influence of municipalities across the regions. The two national associations of municipalities and cities in Austria are mentioned in the Federal Constitution as representatives of municipalities (Art. 115) and play an important (although informal) role in influencing policy-making at the federal level. This is mirrored by Styria and Vorarlberg’s high scores not only in 2020 but already in 2014 (Ladner et al., 2015c), while Tyrol has been given a lower score, thus showing a different regional perception of the (informal) influence of municipalities through their associations.
51For Switzerland, we looked at two out of three Cantons bordering Italy (Grisons and Valais) (Table A2, Appendix 2). Since Swiss Cantons enjoy a high degree of autonomy with regards to local governments (Fiechter, 2010), different contexts would lead to the expectation of a different measurement of LA dimensions in the two Cantons. A recent study measuring the decentralization of politics in Switzerland assessed Grisons as highly decentralized (placing 3rd out of 26), while Valais as in the mid-range of Swiss cantons (12th out of 26) (Mueller, 2011). Also, according to Keuffer (2018) who measured the cantonal index of municipal autonomy, Grisons is placed above the country average, while Valais is below it.
52Evidence for Grisons and Valais show a comparable level of local autonomy in both territories—thus corroborating the 2014 results—and confirming that Swiss municipalities enjoy broad freedom of action on many dimensions independently of their subnational unit. There are nonetheless some important differences. Ladner et al. (2015c) had already stressed the challenge of measuring effective Political discretion in Swiss Cantons. They described how formal political discretion also depends on cantonal laws and regulations and they advocated—as this article attemps to do—for additional qualitative opinions from cantonal or local actors to better assess these very diverse situations. Fiscal autonomy also displays notable differences. This may be because although all Swiss municipalities have the ability to set taxes independently, other levels of government may also raise taxes, which means that municipalities face some restrictions. Scores on Financial transfer system increased in both territories, although there had been no major reform that consistently influenced their financial system. Although Ladner et al. (2019) concluded that a conditional transfer system is dominant in most Swiss cantons, experts in 2020 emphasized that the financial system in Switzerland could hardly be understood as a classical transfer from above: most of the money flows directly to the municipalities. However, there is also a fiscal equalization scheme. These findings on the fiscal and financial dimensions confirm previous research, which shows that Cantons in which municipalities enjoy income surpluses and sufficient financial resources, score higher in assessing their LA (Fiechter, 2010). As for Central/regional access, the contexts differ since no formal institution involves municipalities in subnational policy-making in Grisons, while an association representing all municipalities exists in Valais. In both Cantons, municipalities can also be consulted through the so-called consultation procedure (Vernehmlassungsverfahren).
53In sum, the assessment of local autonomy in the sampled Austrian Länder and Swiss Cantons confirmed the heterogeneity of this concept and corroborated what Fiechter (2010) argued regarding Swiss local autonomy, namely that it may be also determined by local factors.
Discussion and conclusion
54This article addressed the issue of measuring local autonomy in an asymmetric context. Unlike the consolidated indexes, our analysis pivoted on a further differentiation in such a measurement, thus allowing for a more in-depth perspective on the municipal level in some selected country cases.
55Our analysis has shown how a more punctual and, above all, territorially differentiated assessment might provide specific insights on in-country asymmetries, on top of the consolidated cross-country datasets and their undoubted relevance for large comparative studies.
56The analysis of the Italian case showed to what extent differences in local autonomy may depend on institutionally different contexts. In a nutshell, SSRs endowed with more prerogatives displayed relevant differences with OSRs; but these differences mostly emerged on non-specialty related dimensions, thus indicating that the legal framework plays a less essential role than usually believed. Our findings confirmed our first expectation (E1: SSRs in Italy are expected to display relevant differences with OSRs). As shown in Table 1 (columns 4 and 5), SSRs do score notably higher on local autonomy than OSRs (20.10 versus 18.78). Table 2 shows the regional details and provides evidence that the SSRs-average value of 20.10 contains interesting and non-negligible variations. This further confirms that territorial context matters and may also determine relevant variations within formally-equal clusters of regions.
57E1a (SSRs are expected to show noteworthy differences with the OSRs values, particularly on some dimensions) was instead only partially confirmed. Table 1 shows (last column) that the more relevant differences between OSRs and SSRs emerged in fact on non-specialty-related dimensions such as borrowing autonomy, policy scope, and institutional depth, which are of course linked to a different autonomy but not directly to the statute’s prerogatives. The four dimensions that should have shown the biggest differences—namely the three financial dimensions and the one on organizational autonomy on SR; the legal protection, and regional access on IR—were only moderately in line with E1a. Only on financial transfer system does the difference in scores between SSRs and OSRs reach its peak (0.4), while on the rest the differences are fewer than on other non-specialty-related aspects. This opens up the question of whether only looking at formal aspects truly captures the reality of local autonomy in its day to day functioning.
58This last issue also relates to E3 (Italian regions are expected to show lower (or at least equal) LAI scores than the Austrian and Swiss regions), which has been mostly confirmed as well. If we compare Austrian and Swiss LAI results with the Italian ones, we observe that most of the Italian regions (both OSRs and SSRs) score lower than their neighboring territories (Appendix 2 and Tables 1-2 here). The Swiss cantons received by far the highest scores, followed by the Austrian Länder Vorarlberg and Styria. Only the Land Tyrol joins the ranks of some Italian regions. Also considering the separate Self-Rule and Interactive-Rule scores, the same trend—with some exceptions [12]—emerges: the Swiss territories have the highest values, followed by Styria and Vorarlberg, while Tyrol and the Italian SSRs and OSRs remain behind.
59With the help of qualitative and detailed evidence gathered regionally, how can we unpack our evidence and the differences it has brought to light?
60As detailed previously, experts suggest [13] that the (constraining) role of higher government levels—be they the relevant region or the state—may also influence municipal autonomy and its assessment. This has proven particularly true in the SSRs on all three dimensions concerning fiscality as far as the region is concerned, and on organizational autonomy and policy scope as far as the state is concerned. Contrarily, in the OSRs, both regional and state level are observed to hinder local autonomy on institutional depth, policy scope, and state financial system. Evidence from the comparison with Austria and Switzerland supported this point, showing that constitutionally equal regions also score differently in the presence of different contexts and implementations. The outlier position of Tyrol in Austria compared to Styria and Vorarlberg on several dimensions is a telling example.
61Moreover, a certain dissonance between perception/expectations and the reality of local autonomy may also play a role in the different LAI assessments. It has been stressed how, in SSRs, dimensions such as institutional depth, central/regional access, and legal protection are perceived to be weaker than what they should be (or were expected to be) in such regions. In the OSRs, this dissonance is more evident in fiscal and organizational autonomy. Evidence from both Austria and Switzerland supported this argument, confirming Fiechter’s (2010) findings for Switzerland, namely that the various forms of municipal autonomy differ depending on the size of the municipality and the Canton to which it belongs, and are therefore pronouncedly different. He also stated that “local autonomy means many different things to different people” (Clark 1984 in Fiechter 2010, p. 25).
62This allows us to argue that it is not only the formal dimension of autonomy that plays a role and that autonomy can be seen and evaluated from different points of view. In particular, when autonomy is high, its assessment may paradoxically be lower than in other less autonomous regions. Indeed, the perception of the stakes and the expectations of what local autonomy is, and what it should allow, are probably higher. In turn, scores may be lower since effective local autonomy does not necessarily match these expectations. This is also in line with other recent research (Keuffer & Horber-Papazian, 2020) arguing that formal, perceived, and effective autonomy may all sensibly diverge.
63Finally, E2 (the overall 2020 country scores per dimension should be different from those in 2014) has been confirmed. As discussed in the previous section, scores for Italy in 2020 are lower than in 2014 on almost all dimensions (see Table 1) and overall (19.44 to 25.50). This implies that, although no comprehensive reform directly altered Italian local autonomy, something has evidently changed in the past few years and should be further explored.
64A first explanation lies in the role of the indirect impact of legal provisions. Although no explicit reform affecting local government and the powers and competences of local authorities was introduced between 2014 and 2020, a series of changes were nonetheless enacted. These changes, although indirect and “oblique”—i.e., not explicitly involving local government but with a sizeable impact on it nonetheless (Bolgherini & Lippi, 2021; Appendix 3 for Austria and Switzerland)—substantially affected local autonomy and municipal freedom of action, thus inducing a variation in the LAI assessment. Our point here, following Bolgherini and Lippi (2021) is that, although these provisions might not explicitly address the degree of local autonomy, they substantially involve the functioning of municipalities and therefore might have an indirect but nevertheless noticeable effect on it or on its measurement.
65Secondly, some of the differences with the 2014 scores may be attributed to the effects of the global crisis, especially in financial terms. These effects were much more tangible in 2020 than in early 2014 and were therefore not accounted for in the analysis performed previously (Ladner et al., 2015c). The impact of austerity measures has been noted in the SSRs’, e.g., in the central authorities’ stricter administrative supervision. In the case of the OSRs, experts believed austerity to have impacted their level of organizational autonomy, as well as their institutional depth and policy scope. The dramatic effect of the scarcity of (financial and economic) resources on the managing activities, service delivery, and competence compliance of municipal tasks (Lippi & Tsekos, 2019) is a consolidated fact confirmed by this research.
66To sum up, this article showed how context matters, how local autonomy may be context-driven and depend on the state’s territorial structure, and therefore how it must be taken into great consideration when striving to assess local autonomy in differentiated countries. These results may be relevant to analyses involving asymmetric states in multilevel democracies in Europe and beyond, as well as to the methodological (and empirical) debate on the concepts of a/symmetry and local autonomy. To this end, the construction of a more specific and precise multilevel territorial autonomy index, which considers the policy of territorial reorganization and specific contexts should be the next step in in-depth case-study analyses.
Definitions of Data Variables
67The data was compiled after the model introduced by Ladner et al. (2015a). We employed the definitions of the variables used in the original study. The Local Autonomy Index (LAI) consists of two categories: the ‘Self-Rule index’ and the ‘Interactive-Rule index’. The ‘Self-Rule index’ and the ‘Interactive-Rule index’ include several variables themselves. Underneath, these variables, as well as the ‘Self-Rule index’ and the ‘Interactive-Rule index’, are listed and defined.
Self-Rule
- Institutional depth: The extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform
- Policy scope: Range of functions (tasks) where local government is effectively involved in the delivery of the services (be it through their own financial resources and/or through their own staff)
- Effective political discretion: The extent to which local government has real influence (can decide on service aspects) over these functions
- Fiscal autonomy: The extent to which local government can independently tax its population
- Financial transfer system: The proportion of unconditional financial transfers to total financial transfers received by the local government
- Financial self- reliance: The proportion of local government revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges)
- Borrowing autonomy: The extent to which local government can borrow
- Organisational autonomy: The extent to which local government is free to decide about its own organisation and electoral system
69Self-Rule Index: The Self-Rule index has been computed by summing up all scores of its eight different variables (institutional depth, policy scope, effective political discretion, fiscal autonomy, financial transfer system, financial self-reliance, borrowing autonomy, organizational autonomy). Each of the variables were given a score between 0 and 3 (or 4) points, leading to a Self-Rule index between 0 and 28.
Interactive-Rule
- Legal protection: Existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy
- Administrative supervision: Unobtrusive administrative supervision of local government
- Central or regional access: To what extent local authorities are consulted to influence higher level governments’ policy-making
71Interactive-Rule Index: The Interactive-Rule index computed by summing up all scores of its three variables (legal protection, administrative supervision, central or regional access). Each of the variables were given a score between 0 and 3 points, leading to an Interactive-Rule index between 0 and 9.
Scores
72For further details on the scores, the single dimensions description and the Codebook, please refer to Bolgherini, Klotz, Fromm (2020a; 2020b), part of the Project: PARticipation and TERRitorial policies. Tools for policy-making and quality of local democracy—PARtTERRe.
LAI scores for three Austrian Länder per dimension. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
LAI scores for three Austrian Länder per dimension. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
LAI scores for two Swiss Cantons per dimension. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
LAI scores for two Swiss Cantons per dimension. 2014, 2020, variations (+/-), and differences
Italy-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
| Min. | Max. | Median | Mean | STD | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional depth | 0,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,67 | 0,82 |
| Policy scope | 1,00 | 3,33 | 1,83 | 2,12 | 0,63 |
| Effective political discretion | 1,00 | 3,67 | 2,00 | 2,12 | 0,78 |
| Fiscal autonomy | 1,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,67 | 0,62 |
| Financial transfer system | 0,00 | 3,00 | 1,00 | 1,13 | 0,74 |
| Financial self-reliance | 0,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,73 | 0,88 |
| Borrowing autonomy | 0,00 | 2,00 | 1,00 | 1,40 | 0,63 |
| Organizational autonomy | 0,50 | 4,00 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 0,96 |
| Self-Rule (SR) | 7,00 | 18,50 | 14,17 | 13,84 | 3,4 |
| Legal protection | 1,00 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 1,53 | 0,52 |
| Administrative supervision | 0,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,73 | 0,88 |
| Central/regional access | 1,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,67 | 0,62 |
| Interactive-Rule (IR) | 3,00 | 7,00 | 5,00 | 4,93 | 1,16 |
| LAI | 10,00 | 25,50 | 20,00 | 18,78 | 3,85 |
Italy-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
Austria-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
| Min. | Max. | Median | Mean | STD | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional depth | 2,00 | 3,00 | 2,50 | 2,50 | 0,55 |
| Policy scope | 0,38 | 2,50 | 2,17 | 2,00 | 0,61 |
| Effective political discretion | 0,67 | 2,33 | 1,67 | 1,69 | 0,58 |
| Fiscal autonomy | 1,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,83 | 0,75 |
| Financial transfer system | 0,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,83 | 1,17 |
| Financial self-reliance | 1,00 | 3,00 | 1,50 | 1,67 | 0,82 |
| Borrowing autonomy | 1,00 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 1,83 | 0,41 |
| Organizational autonomy | 1,00 | 2,50 | 2,00 | 1,83 | 0,68 |
| Self-Rule (SR) | 12,50 | 18,17 | 15,33 | 15,19 | 2,41 |
| Legal protection | 2,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 2,17 | 0,41 |
| Administrative supervision | 0,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 1,83 | 0,98 |
| Central/regional access | 1,00 | 3,00 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 0,89 |
| Interactive-Rule (IR) | 5,00 | 7,00 | 6,00 | 6,00 | 0,63 |
| LAI | 17,50 | 23,17 | 21,83 | 21,19 | 2,63 |
Austria-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
Switzerland-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
| Min. | Max. | Median | Mean | STD | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional depth | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 0,00 |
| Policy scope | 2,50 | 3,33 | 2,75 | 2,83 | 0,36 |
| Effective political discretion | 1,67 | 3,00 | 2,67 | 2,50 | 0,64 |
| Fiscal autonomy | 4,00 | 4,00 | 4,00 | 4,00 | 0,00 |
| Financial transfer system | 0,00 | 2,00 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,82 |
| Financial self-reliance | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 0,00 |
| Borrowing autonomy | 2,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 2,75 | 0,50 |
| Organizational autonomy | 3,50 | 4,00 | 3,75 | 3,75 | 0,29 |
| Self-Rule (SR) | 21,33 | 25,33 | 22,33 | 22,83 | 1,74 |
| Legal protection | 2,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 2,75 | 0,50 |
| Administrative supervision | 2,00 | 3,00 | 2,50 | 2,50 | 0,58 |
| Central/regional access | 2,00 | 3,00 | 2,50 | 2,50 | 0,58 |
| Interactive-Rule (IR) | 7,00 | 8,00 | 7,50 | 7,75 | 0,96 |
| LAI | 28,33 | 33,33 | 30,33 | 30,58 | 2,17 |
Switzerland-country scores. Minimum and maximum scores; median, mean values, and standard deviation
R-Pearson correlation coefficients. 2014 and 2020 scores
| Country / Region | Correlation |
|---|---|
| Italy / ORS | r = 0.9973 |
| Italy (ORS+SSR) | r = 0.996 |
| Aosta Valley | r = 0.99 |
| Aut. Province Bozen/South Tyrol | r = 0.9966 |
| Aut. Province Trento | r = 0.995 |
| Friuli Venezia Giulia | r = 0.9937 |
| Sicily | r = 0.9796 |
| Sardinia | r = 0.9922 |
| Austria | r = 0.9986 |
| Styria | r = 0.999 |
| Tyrol | r = 0.9984 |
| Vorarlberg | r = 0.9995 |
| Switzerland | r = 0.9991 |
| Grisons | r = 0.9972 |
| Valais | r = 0.9975 |
R-Pearson correlation coefficients. 2014 and 2020 scores
73The 2020 collected data were related with the 2014 data provided by Ladner et al. (2015) through a simple linear correlation analysis to determine the Pearson correlation coefficient. Both datasets are of the same nature and structure, therefore correlation is an appropriate indicator for validity in criterion-related validity checks (Carmines & Woods 2005). All r values confirm a high correlation between the two sets of data.
Selection of Legislative acts enacted 2014-2020 in the chosen Austrian and Swiss regions
74The following tables list some laws, decrees and provisions enacted in the Austrian Länder Tyrol, Styria, Vorarlberg and the Swiss Cantons Grisons and Valais considered in this analysis. The overview covers the years from 2014 (last LAI assessment) to September 2020. These tables are of course not exhaustive, and imply no assessment on the potential effect of these provisions on the local autonomy. However, the lists provide examples of norms and decisions that could affect—directly and indirectly—the daily functioning of the local authorities, and thus have an impact on their autonomy (Bolgherini & Lippi 2021). The content of the provisions was reviewed and listed when explicitly mentioning municipalities’ competences, tasks, duties or finances. This evidence supports our argument developed in the conclusion that the 2014 assessments (and relevant country reports—Ladner et al., 2015c) do not account for such changes that can be instead mirrored by the scores in our analysis.
List of selected provisions in Tyrol (Austria). Main content and normative reference
| Content of Provisions | Normative Reference |
|---|---|
| Amendment of the municipal code 2001 | LGBl. Nr. 109/2020 |
| Electoral rights adjustment law 2020 | LGBl. Nr. 68/2020 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2016, the building code 2018, the tax law, the residence tax law 2003 and the leisure residence tax law | LGBl. Nr. 46/2020 |
| Ordinance on the distribution of financial allocations among municipalities | LGBl. Nr. 19/2020 |
| Amendment of the ordinance concerning the transfer of the management of individual matters on the territory of the local event police of some municipalities to the locally competent district authorities | LGBl. Nr. 17/2020 |
| Financial allocation law 2020 | LGBl. Nr. 7/2020 |
| Amendment of the state police law | LGBl. Nr. 5/2020 |
| Community budget ordinance 2020 | LGBl. Nr. 144/2019 |
| Planning ordinance 2019 | LGBl. Nr. 125/2019 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2016 | LGBl. Nr. 122/2019 |
| Amendment of the residence tax law 2003 | LGBl. Nr. 114/2019 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2016 | LGBl. Nr. 110/2019 |
| Amendment of the municipal code 2001 | LGBl. Nr. 82/2019 |
| Amendment of the municipality employees law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 12/2019 |
| Amendment of the municipality employees law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 128/2018 |
| Amendment of the municipality employees law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 131/2017 |
| Amendment of the building regulations 2011 | LGBl. Nr. 129/2017 |
| Amendment of the land register law 1996 | LGBl. Nr. 86/2017 |
| Amendment of the municipal code 2001 | LGBl. Nr. 77/2017 |
| Amendment of the municipal election regulations 1994 | LGBl. Nr. 76/2017 |
| Tyrolean state election regulations 2017 | LGBl. Nr. 74/2017 |
| Amendment of the law on referendums and popular consultations | LGBl. Nr. 73/2017 |
| Amendment of the state police law | LGBl. Nr. 56/2017 |
| Change of the state order 1989 and adjustment of the regional constitutional law | LGBl. Nr. 53/2017 |
| Administrative reform law 2017 | LGBl. Nr. 26/2017 |
| Amendment of the municipality employees law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 8/2017 |
| Amendment of the municipality employees law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 154/2016 |
| Amendment of the municipal civil service law 1970 | LGBl. Nr. 153/2016 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2013 | LGBl. Nr. 112/2016 |
| Amendment of the building regulations 2011 | LGBl. Nr. 94/2016 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2011 | LGBl. Nr. 93/2016 |
| Amendment of the regulation concerning the transfer of the management of individual matters on the territory of the local building police of some municipalities to the locally competent district authority | LGBl. Nr. 71/2016 |
| Amendment of the state civil servants law 1998, the state civil servants law, the municipal civil servants law 1970, the municipal contract staff law 2012, the Innsbruck municipal civil servants law 1970, and the Innsbruck contract staff law | LGBl. Nr. 42/2016 |
| 5th Amendment on the municipal contractual employees’ law 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 6/2016 |
| 4th Amendment on the municipal contractual employees’ law | LGBl. Nr. 32/2015 |
| Election rights adjustment law 2014 | LGBl. Nr. 76/2014 |
| Amendment of the community remuneration law 1998 | LGBl. Nr. 69/2014 |
| 3rd Amendment on the municipal contractual employees’ law | LGBl. Nr. 23/2014 |
| Amendment of the municipal administrative charges ordinance 2007 | LGBl. Nr. 17/2014 |
| Amendment of the state police law | LGBl. Nr. 1/2014 |
List of selected provisions in Tyrol (Austria). Main content and normative reference
List of selected provisions in Vorarlberg (Austria). Main content and normative reference
| Content of Provisions | Normative Reference |
|---|---|
| Amendment of the rescue law | LGBl. Nr. 50/2020 |
| Law on an amendment to the municipal law | LGBl. Nr. 62/2019 |
| Amending law on the electoral law -collective amendment | LGBl. Nr. 25/2019 |
| Law on an amendment to the municipal law | LGBl. Nr. 15/2019 |
| Amendment of the spatial planning law | LGBl. Nr. 4/2019 |
| Regulation on municipal liability | LGBl. Nr. 84/2018 |
| Law for the change of the local law – collective amendment | LGBl. Nr. 34/2018 |
| Law on deregulation and administrative simplification 2017 – collective law | LGBl. Nr. 78/2017 |
| Amendment to the municipal employees law 2005 | LGBl. Nr. 51/2015 |
| Amendment of spatial planning law | LGBl. Nr. 22/2015 |
| Law to strengthen the right to choose one’s personality and direct democracy – collective amendment | LGBl. Nr. 21/2014 |
List of selected provisions in Vorarlberg (Austria). Main content and normative reference
List of selected provisions in Styria (Austria). Main content and normative reference
| Content of Provisions | Normative Reference |
|---|---|
| Amendment of the standing and salary orders for municipal employees | LGBl. Nr. 90/2020 |
| Amendment of the zoning law 2019 | LGBl. Nr. 11/2020 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2019 | LGBl. Nr. 6/2020 |
| Amendment of the statute of the capital city of Graz 1967 | LGBl. Nr. 97/2019 |
| Amendment of the municipal regulation 1967 | LGBl. Nr. 96/2019 |
| Law on crop protection | LGBl. Nr. 88/2019 |
| Law on animal breeding | LGBl. Nr. 74/2019 |
| Amendment law on electoral law | LGBl. Nr. 71/2019 |
| Decree on the municipal budget | LGBl. Nr. 34/2019 |
| Amendment of the municipal regulation 1967 | LGBl. Nr. 29/2019 |
| Amendment of the law on organization of vocational school 1979 | LGBl. Nr. 6/2019 |
| Decree on regulation of upper liability limit | LGBl. Nr. 106/2018 |
| Law on educational reform | LGBl. Nr. 72/2018 |
| Amendment of the law on fees regarding accommodation and holiday homes | LGBl. Nr. 55/2018 |
| Law on territorial and regional development 2018 and amendment of the law on territorial planning 2010 | LGBl. Nr. 117/2017 |
| Amendment of the decree on municipal fee on administration 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 86/2017 |
| Decree on commission fees for municipalities | LGBl. Nr. 85/2017 |
| Amendment law on municipal fees | LGBl. Nr. 149/2016 |
| Modification of the local election regulation Graz 2012 | LGBl. Nr. 135/2016 |
| Amendment of the local law on personnel representation 1994 | LGBl. Nr. 102/2016 |
| Amendment of the municipal employees’ law 1957 and municipal contractual employees law 1962—municipal employees law amendment 2015 | LGBl. Nr. 6/2015 |
| Amendment of the regional planning law 2010 | LGBl. Nr. 140/2014 |
| Amendment of the regulation of municipalities 1967 and of the law on the organization of municipal associations | LGBl. Nr. 131/2014 |
| Amendment on the electoral law | LGBl. Nr. 98/2014 |
| Amendment of the statute of the capital city Graz 1967 | LGBl. Nr. 77/2014 |
| Law on the municipal structural reform | LGBl. Nr. 31/2014 |
List of selected provisions in Styria (Austria). Main content and normative reference
List of selected provisions in Grisons (Switzerland). Main content and normative reference
| Content of Provisions | Normative Reference |
|---|---|
| Decree on extraordinary competences for municipalities | AGS 2020-020 |
| Law on regional planning | AGS 2019-001 |
| Law on municipalities | AGS 2018-002 |
| Law on taxes of municipalities and churches | AGS 2018-010 |
| Amendment of the police law | AGS 2018-023 |
| Law on middle schools | BR 425.000 |
| Law on nursing care | AGS 2017-050 |
| Decree on the financial supervision of municipalities | AGS 2015-022 |
| Decree on the financial equalization | AGS 2015-021, BR 175.100 |
| Decree on the territorial reform | AGS 2015-019 |
| Tax law | AGS 2014-020 |
List of selected provisions in Grisons (Switzerland). Main content and normative reference
List of selected provisions in Valais (Switzerland). Main content and normative reference
| Content of Provisions | Normative Reference |
|---|---|
| Law on the justice council | AGS 2020-057 |
| Introductory law on the federal law on debt enforcement and bankruptcy | AGS 2020-038 |
| Implementation law on the federal law of animal protection | AGS 2020-017 |
| Tax law | AGS 2020-066 |
| Law on reference databases and the harmonization of registers of persons, businesses and companies, buildings and apartments | AGS 2020-027 |
| Decision on intramunicipal financial equalization | AGS 2019-052 |
| Decree on agriculture and development of the rural area | AGS 2019-044 |
| Law on the finance of the 3rd correction of the river Rhone | AGS 2019-038 |
| Implementation law on the federal law of territorial planning | AGS 2019-024 |
| Decision on intramunicipal financial equalization 2019 | AGS 2018-042 |
| Law on shop opening | AGS 2018-020 |
| Law on the promotion of mountain railways | SGS 902.1 |
| Zoning law | SGS 705.1 |
| Law on the cantonal police | SGS 550.1 |
| Law on the protection of nature and heritage | SGS 451.1 |
| Law on agriculture and the development of the rural space | AGS 2017-028 |
| Law on accommodation for asylum seekers | SGS 142.3 |
| Introductory law on the Swiss penal code | SGS 311.1 |
List of selected provisions in Valais (Switzerland). Main content and normative reference
75Source: Authors’ compilation from the Legal Information System of the Canton of Valais (https://lex.vs.ch/app/de/change_documents).
Information on raw data processing
76The raw data that has been exported from the survey software Opinio does in most points not require any prior processing to match the necessary formatting. For most of the asked questions (regardless of which part of the survey the experts were asked), the respondents were able to choose their answers by selecting a value point 0 to 3 (included). Therefore the numbers exported from Opinio are equalling the option/value point chosen for each answer. I.e. if a respondent chose to answer by selecting value point 2, the exported data also showed the number 2 as answer for the given question. (Number shown = Value point).
77This holds true for all questions besides the questions related to ‘policy scope’ and ‘effective political discretion’. Both these questions were built up by multiple sub-questions which were not to be answered by simply choosing a number as described above, but rather by selecting a written answer option. In this case, however, the exported data did not show which written statement was selected in a written text, but rather by showing a number which represented the selected choice. Therefore, the numbers shown for the two mentioned questions in the raw data, need to be converted into the intended value of the given answer. The numbers shown in the raw data, represent the following chosen text options:
- Raw Data Number ‘3’ = Answer ‘Fully responsible’
- Raw Data Number ‘2’ = Answer ‘Partly responsible’
- Raw Data Number ‘1’ = Answer ‘Not at all responsible’.
78To convert these raw data numbers into their respective value, the original codebook by Ladner et al. (2015b) has foreseen a weighting process. The codebook foresees one (1) value point for the answer ‘fully responsible’ (raw data number 3), a half (0,5) value points for the answer ‘party responsible’ (raw data number 2) and zero (0) value points for the answer ‘not at all responsible’ (raw data number 1).
79Each ‘sub-question’ is consisting of either one or two ‘sub-sub-questions’. To calculate the value point of each ‘sub-question’, the raw data numbers of the ‘sub-sub-questions’ first have to be converted into value points (as described) and afterward added. The value of each ‘‘sub-question’ can be found in each table titled ‘Subtotal’.
80After successfully converting the raw data numbers into value points and calculating the value of the ‘sub-questions’, the ‘sub-question’ values have to be further processed to finally reach the overall values of ‘policy scope’ and ‘effective political discretion’. To do so, all the value points of the sub-questions of ‘policy scope’ or ‘effective political discretion’ (see: ‘Subtotal’ in each table) need to be summed. According to the original codebook by Ladner et al. (2015b; 2019), a maximum of 4 points can be awarded for ‘policy scope’ and ‘effective political discretion’ each. However, if a respondent chooses ‘fully responsible’ for all (sub)-sub-questions, a total of 12 value points instead of the allowed 4 points would occur. Therefore, the sum of the sub-question value points must be divided by 3 (12 possible value points maximum / 4 value points allowed = 3).
81After the correct value points as foreseen by the original codebook by Ladner et al. (2015b) were calculated, the Self-Rule index, and the Interactive-Rule index could simply be determined by adding the value points of each question falling under the respective category ‘Self-Rule’ and ‘Interactive-Rule’.
82Furthermore, in a subsequent process, the answers given in the questionnaire were compared with their corresponding free-text answer. If the free-text answer indicted that the respondent felt slightly different in his evaluation but was not able to voice their opinion due to pre-set answer options as described above, the values were altered accordingly.
83As multiple questionnaires have been filled in for the same country and even the same region, the averages of all answers regarding the same country or the same region was calculated to gain a mean value for each question, the Self-Rule index, the Interactive-Rule index and the local autonomy index.
Deviation from the original Ladner et al. (2015a)’s codebook and solution
84As the PARtTERRe-dataset is based on the original codebook by Ladner et al. (2015a), the asked questions aimed to replicate the ones asked in the original survey. However, while for most questions the procedure of replicating the original questions was quite easy, the codebook became somewhat unclear with the sub-question on ‘police’ in the main-question of ‘effective political discretion.’
85While the additional coding instructions for the ‘effective political discretion’ section, were outlying the breakdown of each sub-question, using the same phrasing consistently not only within each sub-question but also among all sub-questions in this section, the sub-question on ‘police’ was deviating.
86The sub-question on ‘police’ allowed to award one (1) point in total, however splitting the sub-question into two parts by allowing to award “1 point if the local government can decide on public order police services” and “0.5 points if the local government can decide on traffic police services”. The deviation in phrasing (public order police services vs. traffic police services), prompted the 2020 survey to create two questions (one on public order police services and one on traffic police) in the sub-question ‘police,’ thereby allowing the possibility to score two (2) points instead of one (1) point, if both questions were answered with ‘local government can fully decide.’
87This possibility of being able to score two instead of only one point also increased the maximum number of points archivable in the main-question of ‘effective political discretion’ from 12 to 13 points.
88After careful consideration on how to deal with this increase of the maximum points, five ways were identified:
- Deleting the additional question regarding the ‘traffic police’ without any substitution or inclusion in the further process reduces the maximum point score of the sub-question on ‘police’ to the original level of one (1) point.
- Delete the additional question on ‘traffic police,’ thereby reducing the maximum point score of the sub-question on ‘police’ to the original level of one (1) point and dealing with the results of the deleted question on ‘traffic police’ as if they would be a ‘free text answer.’
- Divide the scores of the sub-question on ‘police’ by two. Thereby, the results of both questions (on public order police services and traffic police) would be equally valued, and both would be taken into the ratings on ‘police’ while respecting the original point maximum of one (1) point.
- Accept the new maximum of 13 points in the main-question. The additional point would thereby be distributed throughout all the answers given to the sub-questions in the main-question of ‘effective political discretion.’ As the main-question can only generate a maximum of four (4) points, the original maximum of 12 points generated by the added sub-question answered would have needed to be divided by three (3): 12 (maximum points of the added sub-question results) / 4 (maximum points of the main-question) = 3. By increasing the maximum points of the added sub-question results to 13, following the calculation example above, would need to be divided by 3,25 to respect the four (4) maximum points possibly being awarded by main-question.
- Re-Code the received answers. Following the examples given by the phrasing and structure of the previous sub-questions, one must assume that there is a hierarchy within the sub-question on ‘police,’ where ‘traffic police services’ need to be understood as inferior to the superior ‘public order police services.’ This assumption can be supported by, as stated, the structure of the comparable sub-questions, on the one hand, but also by the phasing within the sub-question on ‘police’ itself, in which ‘traffic police services’ are set into relation with half a point while ‘public order police services’ to one full point. To respect the original maximum of one (1) point in the sub-question on ‘police’ while also respecting the internal hierarchy within the sub-question itself, a re-coding within this sub-question can be considered. The proposed re-coding within the sub-question would thereby look like the following:
While the answers are given for the question on the decision power of the local governments on ‘public order police services’ would in a first step stay untouched. The answers on traffic police services, however, would first be rearranged that 0 points given as answer would be converted into 0,5 points, 0,5 points into 0,75 points, and 1 point would stay 1. In a subsequent step, the unchanged answers of the ‘public order police service’-question would be multiplied with the newly arranged points of the ‘traffic police service’-question. This process would guarantee a mathematically correct weighting of the answers regarding the ‘public order police services’ with the ‘traffic police services’ and, at the same time, respect the internal hierarchy.
89Following the reasoning already presented in way 5), possibility 3) was ruled out as it does not respect the hierarchy within the sub-question and would treat both (public order police and traffic police) equally.
90Equally fast, option 1) was eliminated as, while the question on traffic police was originally not foreseen, it cannot be deemed unnecessary, but must be seen as additional, more specifying information on the sub-question ‘police’ and therefore should be taken into account in some way.
91After internal discussions, also option 4) was eliminated. This survey should not only serve as the basis for a dataset that can stand on its own but also needs to be able to be compared to the previous datasets created based on the original codebook, the factor of comparability needs to be put forward. On the basis of the importance of comparability, an increase of the maximum points of the added sub-question results from 12 to 13 would interfere with the accuracy of future comparisons of this dataset with previous or subsequent ones.
92Both options 2) and 5), however, were deemed possible for the subsequent creation of the dataset. However, from the comparability point of view, option 2) was decided to be used in the following, as it does not mathematically interfere with the results of the sub-question on ‘police’ but can be compared to the method used with all other questions in this survey, where all answers are weighted using the ‘free text’ option underneath every question.
93Option 5), however, due to its mathematical accuracy of including the addiction gained information on ‘traffic police’ within the sub-question on ‘police’, can be used to create a separate dataset, which can be discussed in a separate article.
Covid-19 Impact on Local Autonomy: an instant survey
94The first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic was ongoing during the data collection period in May and June 2020. The original questionnaire was therefore extended by an additional question of the pandemic’s expected impact on the degree of the autonomy of municipalities. The question allowed choosing between the answer options ‘Not at all’, ‘Scarcely/Temporarily’, ‘Partly/Mid-term effects’, ‘Substantially/Long-term effects’, and ‘Completely/Permanently’ and gave the usual additional option of adding a free-text explanation.
95For the country level ‘Austria’, the majority (five out of six) of answers given were foreseeing a scare/temporally change in local autonomy, while the remaining answers expected a mid-term effect. A similar pattern can be observed at the regional level, where three out of four answered with ‘Scarcely/Temporarily’ and one ‘Partly/Mid-term effects’. At both territorial levels’ comments revolved around the issue of centralization of powers during the crisis, most likely stemming from the country-wide lockdown from March to April 2020 and the with that imposed restrictions on professional and private lives.
96The answers given for the country level ‘Italy’, were distributed between ‘Scarcely/Temporarily’ with six out of 15 answers, ‘Partly/Mid-term effects’ with four out of 15 answers, and ‘Substantially/Long-term effects’ with five out of 15 answers. On the regional level, the answers were culmination, especially on the answers’ Scarcely/Temporarily’ (six out of 13), and ‘Partly/Mid-term effects’ (six out of 13), only one answer expecting ‘Substantially/Long-term effects’. While the most frequent areas discussed on the country level were finances and budgeting, the regional level besides financial questions focused on centralization matters regarding the crisis, e.g., interventions taken by a higher level for better health care coordination and the containment of the virus.
97Both the country and regional level in Switzerland were expecting no changes at all, with four out of four answers on the country level and three out of four on the regional level, with ‘Scarcely/Temporarily’ being the remaining answer on the regional level.
98While, therefore, in Switzerland, no changes are expected by a significant majority, the experts foresee a different development for Italy and Austria. For both the regional and country levels in Austria and the Italian country-level, the experts suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic changes are only temporal. Standing out is the Italian regional level, where the judgment is split between temporal changes and mid-term effects on the local autonomy.
99However, it is essential to note that the data was collected in May and June 2020. A time in which the daily registered Covid-19 cases in all three countries examined were on a decline entering a relatively stable period of new cases registered. A possible explanation for the given answers, especially the notable difference between the answers given by the Swiss experts compared to the ones given by the Italian and Austrian experts, could stem from the relatively low number of daily cases in Switzerland compared to the other two countries and the therefore differently perceived need to limit the local autonomy. Additionally, with Italy registering cases the earliest followed by Austria, both counties with a fast and steep increase, it can be suspected that both countries (especially Italy) were looking for fast and drastic countermeasures.
100At the time of writing this article in early November 2020, all three countries are experiencing a sharp increase in cases exceeding the maximum daily cases registered during the first wave in March 2020 vastly [14]. Therefore, the question arises if the experts’ estimates during the data collection period would still hold true today or if the experts would reevaluate their answers.
References
Bolgherini, S., Klotz, G., & Fromm, U.L. (2020b). Dataset on Differentiated Local Autonomy in Italy, GESIS Data Archive Datorium. doi: 10.7802/2119.
Bolgherini, S., & Lippi, A. (2021). Oblique-change matters: ‘bradyseismic’ institutional change in local government. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 51(1), 117-135.
Carmines, E. G. & J. A., Woods (2005). Validity assessment. In K. Kempf-Leonard (Ed.), Encyclopedia of social measurement (pp.933-937). New York: Elsevier.
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., & Baldersheim, H. (2015a). Dataset. Local autonomy index for European countries (1990-2014). Release 1.0. Brussels. European Commission.
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H. (2015b). Self-rule index for local authorities (Release 1.0). Final report. Brussels. European Commission DG Regional &Urban Policy.
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H. (2015c). Local autonomy index for the European countries (1990-2014): Country profiles (En ligne: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/lai_country_profiles.zip).
Notes
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[1]
The research leading to these results has received funding from the International Mobility Grant 2020 Province Bolzano/Bozen (Mobilità internazionale di ricercatrici e ricercatori/Förderung der internationalen Mobilität von Forschern und Forscherinnen), Project: PARticipation and TERRitorial policies. Tools for policy-making and quality of local democracy—PARtTERRe. We thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that helped us improve the previous version of this article.
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[2]
In this article, we understand “region” as subnational/sub-state entities, namely the subnational constitutional unit of each state, e.g., the Regioni in Italy, the Länder in Austria and Germany, the Cantons in Switzerland, etc.
-
[3]
Namely Albania, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine.
-
[4]
It is worth stressing that the LAI dimensions and indicators cover the main aspects of local autonomy with a mostly formal and de jure approach, thus inevitably disregarding more de facto dynamics, which we are focusing on here.
-
[5]
Sicily has been enjoying this competence since its Autonomy Statute of 1946 (Special Statute of the Region Sicily, R.D.Lgs. No. 455/1946). Constitutional Law No. 2/1993, 23 September 1993, ruled on the modifications and integrations of the special Statutes for Aosta Valley, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-South Tyrol.
-
[6]
The Trentino-Alto Adige Statute (Art. 4) sets the legal basis for all municipalities of this region, among others, the formal autonomy of municipalities, their functions, political organs, and administration. Regional Law No. 2/2018 (Codex of the local entities of the Autonomous Region Trentino-Alto Adige) regulates the regional competence of the local authorities.
-
[7]
The total number of municipalities is currently (2021) 7,904, with around 60 million inhabitants on the national territory; the average municipal population counts around 7,600 inhabitants, and the total number of municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants is slightly over 500. There are 5,495 (69,5%) municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants spread all over the country.
-
[8]
The first states that every governmental body at the same level has the same organizational structure and is called to perform the same functions. Introduced in the Constitution as a heritage of the Napoleonic model, this principle clashed (and still does) with the dispersed Italian reality, formed by municipalities of very different sizes (from tiny villages to huge cities, all having exactly the same functions and equipped with the same organizational tools) (Vandelli, 2018). The differentiation principle—gradually introduced starting with the administrative reforms in the 1990s and then with the 2001 constitutional reform (ibidem; Bobbio 2015)—states instead that, when assigning an administrative function, the actual ability of the receiving entities to govern must be considered. Following this principle, some reform laws have begun to assign specific responsibilities solely to municipalities with a number of inhabitants above a certain threshold (or other intermediate bodies, such as mountain communities or municipal unions).
-
[9]
For the sake of transparency, it is important to acknowledge that another interesting option, namely Spain (whose asymmetry is more similar to that of Italy and had been “differently” assessed in the LAI research—although not by region but by size of the municipalities), has been discarded for practical reasons. Austria and Switzerland were in fact already considered in the more articulated project this analysis is part of, namely a biennial Project named PARtTERRe (PARticipation and TERRitorial policies), conducted at Eurac Research in Bolzano/Bozen (Italy) and aiming to explore the link between territorial policies and citizen participation. The same applies to their selected regions, which are meant to merely provide further information and food for thought and not systematic evidence.
-
[10]
For a detailed description of each dimension, see the Codebook published in Bolgherini et al. (2020a; 2020b), as reported in Appendix 2.
-
[11]
See the Codebook published in Bolgherini et al. (2020a; 2020b) and Appendix 2 again. For a detailed explanation on the difference between LA and LAI see Ladner & Keuffer (2021).
-
[12]
On some dimensions, e.g. policy discretion or organizational autonomy, some Italian SSRs score equal or higher than the considered Austrian Länder. Remarkably high are the SSRs Aosta Valley and Friuli Venezia-Giulia, which in some dimensions (e.g. policy scope, policy discretion, financial transfer system) equal or even surpasse the Swiss cantons.
-
[13]
The possible flaws and the potential biases in the expert survey methodology have been already discussed in section 4. We however recall here that differences may also depend, at least partly, on the different experts’ opinions and assessments, on the fact that the scores are mean averages, and the experts were asked to measure the dimensions based on their own expertise and perception/interpretation.
-
[14]
Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (CRC): https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/.
