A thesis, formulated in the 1960s by a specialist on the history of the Swiss banking system, has long dominated historiography: the one which maintains that, by international comparison, Swiss banking structures are characterized by a low degree of concentration and remarkable systemic stability. While not incorrect, this thesis reflects an overly linear view of the history of this financial centre; in light of the profound changes that occurred during the last quarter of the twentieth century, it no longer seems tenable. The question arises, then, of whether it must necessarily be ruled out.
Probably not. The financial sector is high risk and it is true that, while by no means immune to crises and sometimes more seriously affected by them than its foreign counterparts, the Swiss banking centre has long been regarded as particularly stable and secure, at the price of a certain “conservatism”. This no doubt leads to the risk of retrospective illusion, which consists in attributing to all of the institutions that make up this financial centre the qualities recognized, rightly or wrongly, as belonging to the centre itself. Yet a mere glance at history suggests a more nuanced reading of the situation: we have only to consider the fate of the eight or nine institutions that formed, at the end of World War I, the group of the so-called “big” banks, one of two main pillars of the Swiss banking system, to understand that “longevity” remains the exception rather than the rule, since, of these nine, only two—admittedly of systemic and global importance—have survived to the present day…